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Abstract and Kevwords 
 
After almost a decade of downsizing, Russian agriculture has been steadily growing 
since the end of 90’s against the background of deep organizational changes and 
innovations. The traditional collective farming segment is the key target and subject 
of innovations. Outside investors and operators have acquired control over farm assets from 
the primary nominal owners and possessors. As a result, exceptionally large commercial farm 
operations - "agroholdings" - are being created. Both inside and outside innovators are 
introducing organizational changes such as vertical integration, custom and contract 
farming, land leasing, machinery sharing and others. The paper discusses size, scope and 
character of the ongoing innovations and their short and long-term consequences.  
 



















 1.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
 
During the 1990s Russian and FSU agriculture experienced dramatic 
decapitalization, downsizing and fragmentation. All the key indicators of agricultural 
efficiency and productivity have substantially deteriorated. According to the official 
paradigm, the organizational landscape of domestic agriculture is composed of three main 
sectors ("orders"): collective farms that have undergone primary privatization, individual 
(family) farms, and subsistence plots 
2. Due to many reasons, including insufficient structural 
reform policy, private farming did not take deep root in Russia. Collective farms and 
subsistence plots (that are closely linked and interdependent with collective farms) both 
account for the largest share in gross agricultural output (about 45 and 50%, 
respectively). 
Within the private investment community Russian agriculture has inherited a 
reputation of sector fraught with loss of credit and low return on investment. Agricultural 
financing was considered the highest risk venture-type activity. 
However, at the end of 1990s the widely held perception of Russian farm sector as 
"hopelessly stagnating" began to change. Russian agriculture, especially crop production, has 
been steadily growing since 1999. Deep organizational changes and innovations are 
underway in the domestic farm sector. The domestic collective farming segment is the 
key target and subject of innovations. Outside investors and operators have acquired 
control over farm assets (including thousands of hectares of Russian farmland) from the 
primary nominal owners and possessors. As a result, exceptionally large commercial farm 
operations - "agroholdings" - are being created. At the same time, some "traditional" 
agricultural producers have begun to modify and extend their farming activities. Both inside 
and outside innovators are introducing organizational changes such as vertical integration, 
custom and contract farming, land leasing, machinery sharing and others. 
Our working "hypothesis" is that "new agricultural operators" (NAOs) is a 
heterogeneous transitional sector in the domestic agriculture. For the purposes and 
convenience of the study, to draw the virtual frontiers we define two main features of the 
newly emerging "sector": 
•  Active participation of non-agricultural entity in the farm production decision-making and 
•  Investing ("value at risk") in agriculture. 
One should stress that the definition of NAOs sector frontiers is rather conditional. 
NAOs may be viewed as both a transitional sector  and a group of ways of converting 
"traditional Soviet collective farm" into something different. We will describe this later in 
the paper. "New agricultural operators " is a conditional term that we use to identify and 
describe new players and new functions in the Russian agriculture. 
 
The size, scope and character of the ongoing innovations are a serious challenge not 
only to the domestic, but also to the world agriculture in general. Since most NAOs rely on 
highly hierarchic managerial structures and hired labor, they represent an even further retreat 
from the individual family farm concept.  In this paper we extend and update analysis 
presented in Rylko and Jolly, 2005. 
 
 
2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND WORKING HYPOTHESIS  
 
Theory says that at the heart of any innovation lie transaction and coordination costs 
along with informational asymmetries. A firm develops new ways of doing business to reduce 
these costs and align incentives among and between economic agents. An organizational 
innovation has the potential to reduce or mitigate factor and product market distortions - at 
least in the short run. m the long run an organizational innovation can lead to 
inefficiencies or inequities through, for example, concentration of power and absentee 
ownership. Such inefficiencies can overwhelm any short-term societal gains. As a 
consequence, we believe that it is essential to understand how and why the organization of 
agricultural firms in Russia is changing and what these changes imply for future productivity, 
competitiveness, rural development and income distribution. 
 
Several working "hypotheses" should be mentioned that could explain the 
emergence of NAOs. Among them are: 
 
•  Incomplete   and   insufficient   markets.    Incomplete   transitional   markets   cause   
market imperfections and stimulate over-reliance on vertical and horizontal 
integration as a tool to mitigate extremely high transaction costs and risks. It seems 
more economical and less risky to produce inside the firm rather than buy from outside. 
Such a behavior is a specific analogue of well-studied developments in the US and 
West European agriculture in the 1950s, 1960s. Incomplete transitional markets also 
cause unequal conditions for competition between firms and industry branches. Those 
firms win that have better access to political lobbying groups and administrative power. 
As a rule, new agricultural entrants possess such a political and administrative 
power. 
 
•  Weak or non-existent rural banking system. It makes intra-firm capital flows the 
only real alternative tool of investing in agriculture. 
 
•  Manageability trap. The immediate result of collective farms' primary privatization 
was that land assets were divided into hundreds of small virtual land shares, while the rest 
of farm assets formed charter capital of the farms. It created a very risky 
environment for the farm management, control and investment. In addition, the 
productivity of a "traditional" collective farm was so low that it was incapable of 
servicing short or medium term debt.  This led to the development of new organizational 
strategies that could bypass the fragmentation of assets. 
 
•  Consequences of the 1998 financial crisis. Devaluation of Ruble led to a sizable 
import substitution and export-oriented demand for domestic foods. Despite low 
prices for key agricultural inputs and devaluation of farm debts it met very low 
supply elasticity of the "traditional" Russian agricultural producers. New entrants 
and formats have captured the opportunity. Again, studied phenomena can be viewed 




•  Long-term shifts in opportunity cost of capital (type of application of the convergence 
theory). One may say that due to dramatic long-term decapitalization and downsizing 
agricultural asset values are now more in line with earnings. From this point of view 
agricultural investments are quite competitive (as compared with other sectors of the 
economy).  
•  Low level of domestic farm support and protection. According to OECD calculations, 
Russian PSE as a percent of all farm revenues has been kept at an incredibly low level in 
comparison with all developed countries economies. It has made it necessary for 
agricultural producers to search for a financial and organizational  “umbrella” on the part 
of rich domestic energy and other industry giants (Drache, 1964). 
 
 
3.  RESEARCH APPROACH AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
 
 
The research questions posed in the foregoing discussion are: 
 
1.  Why and how is organizational innovation taking place in Russian agriculture? 
 
2.  What is the scope of changes? 
 
3.  What do these changes imply in terms of future productivity, competitiveness and 
social welfare? 
 
4.  Why is a further retreat from the concept of independent family farm taking place 
and is it inevitable? 
 
In order to address these issues we employ the combination of empirical 
analysis, survey (interviews and questionnaire) and (micro) case study approaches. Case 
study research methods are ideally suited for examining "how" and "why" questions. Further, 
they can be particularly helpful when dealing with unprecedented change and when data is 
not available or reliable. In this section, we sketch the approach taken and describe the 
research design. Our case study research design follows the model developed by Yin 
4. 
 
Individual NAO was chosen as a unit of analysis. We developed a series of case 
studies of NAOs that differ by their position within the supply chain and their motivation 
for organizational innovation. The initial propositions were as follows: 
Organizational innovation by NAOs 
a.  Is driven largely by the firm's need to reduce transaction and coordination 
costs or exploit economies of size, 
b.  Is driven by the need to reduce costs associated with inadequate market 
infrastructure, commercial law, political influence or regulation, 
с   Is driven by opportunities to acquire productive assets that are under-priced 
due to market imperfections, information asymmetries, poverty or the 
absence of clearly defined and enforceable property rights. 
A standard case study protocol was developed. Finally, cross case analysis was 
conducted to examine the propositions listed earlier. As of today we have conducted 5 full-
size case studies and several dozen micro cases addressing a limited number of key questions. 
Complementary to case study, the method of empirical analysis was used. Various 
sources of information, including Russian Internet, newspapers, industry journals, personal 
contacts were employed to put together and perpetually update the unique Russian NAOs data 
baseIt contains the background information on more than 150 NAOs. Finally, during 2004 the 
survey has been carried out, which addressed more in-depth issues requiring individual 
company management answers. As of the end of 2004, representatives of 28 companies participated in the survey. 
 
 
5.  MAIN RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
Section 4 provides just a brief summary of most important findings of the ongoing 








  MTS Olimpia: “custom harvester”. In the early 1990s, a group of young Russian 
entrepreneurs started a firm serving as a debt collector on behalf of energy firms in southern 
Russia. In 1998, following Russia’s financial crisis, they identified some apparent profit 
opportunities in grain production. However, they also observed that expansion of grain 
production was constrained by the supply of agricultural machinery, especially combines. 
Using their connections with financial institutions, they purchased several modern combines. 
They created a limited liability company named Agricultural Machinery-Technological 
Station (MTS) Olimpia to provide custom farming services to corporate farms (former 
collectives) in Krasnodar and Rostov regions of southern Russia. After a few years of 
operation, MTS Olimpia was custom farming 3,500-4,500 hectares of small grains and row 
crops. MTS Olimpia charged relatively high custom rates by western standards and earned 
reasonable rates of return. However, other custom operators have recently entered the market 
reducing custom margins. In 2003, the owners of MTS Olimpia purchased assets of bankrupt 
collective farm and entered full-scale agricultural production on leased land. 
 
  Bank Avangard: “supply chain management”.  Bank Avangard is a large Russian 
financial group heavily involved in the domestic malting business. The firm requires 300,000 
metric tons of malting barley annually. In order to assure a reliable supply, Avangard-Agro, 
the bank’s agricultural entity, contracted with 15 collective farms to grow malting barley on 
the total square of 70 th ha. More than 130 foreign make grain combines were leased out to 
the farms on a 15-year basis. The company also provides seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers to 
the farms. It also guarantees to buy the malting barley at the current spot price plus a fixed 
premium. If the farms fail to deliver malting quality barley due to unfavorable weather, the 
company still guarantees to purchase their feed barley at the current market price, but without 
premium. The bank has entered into an agreement with the Russian subsidiary of Syngenta, a 
multinational agrochemical company, to provide chemicals and agronomic TA. In 2004 
Avangard-Agro took two collective farms in Orel and Orenburg oblasts to grow malting 
barley seeds on 15 th. ha. 
 
EFCO: “food processor”. During the 1990s, EFCO emerged as one of the leading 
private oilseed crushing and processing firms in Russia. In the spring of 2000, the company 
was asked by the governor of Belgorod Oblast to participate in the major regional farm 
restructuring process. EFCO was primarily interested in securing a reliable source of 
sunflower seeds for its vegetable-oil operations. The company initially acquired the assets of 
more than twenty technically bankrupt former collectives and entered into land lease 
agreements with hundreds of individual land share owners 
6. As the lease of the land shares 
shifted from the failing former collectives to EFCO, rural people in Belgorod Oblast began 
receiving stable in-kind lease payments for the first time since the early 1990s. EFCO also 
expanded into two neighboring regions, ultimately leasing more than 100,000 hectares for 
sunflower and other crops. EFCO established an agricultural management subsidiary to handle 
farm operations. All key investment and production decisions, however, had to be approved at headquarters. Since its inception, the company has made significant investments in crop-
production machinery and equipment. They have drastically reduced unprofitable livestock 
operations associated with the former collectives. Each season, they would enter into large-
scale purchase agreements with input suppliers and obtain necessary quantities of fertilizers 
and pesticides at competitive rates. A field and farm security system has been launched to 
reduce - traditional - theft. The number of farm employees has been gradually reduced. Most 
of the former farm managers have been replaced. However, EFCO also provides health care, 
social service programs, and technical training for workers. Later EFCO had organized 
“cooperatives” in each former collective farm’s area to manage social services. The land 
rental payments plus fixed company contributions have been used to create a “social benefits” 
package. The local cooperative decides how to spend this money. The first results of this 
innovative social scheme are promising. Recently the company, being rather dissatisfied about 
general results of farming endeavor, launched “big private farmer” project: each group of 22 
farms top managers receive the opportunity of the gradual farm “management buy-out”.  
 
 Agrovoronezh:  “agricultural venture entrepreneur”. In 2003, a group of private 
investors formed an agricultural production company in one of Central Black Soil regions. 
The investor group consisted of several local and Moscow-based individuals with ties to the 
oil and gas and construction business. During the next several months, the company 
negotiated with the local administration to acquire the non-land assets of a bankrupt former 
collective farm in one of the districts. At the same time, the firm organized the purchase of 
land shares from the former collective farm’s employees. By the autumn of 2004, some 
10,000 hectares of land had been purchased and ownership rights had been registered in the 
local land office. Another 10 th. ha hectares are currently being converted from land lease to 
land ownership. To facilitate this process, Agrovoronezh has agreed to continue land lease 
payments for another four years. Ultimately the firm intends to acquire up to 50,000 hectares. 
At the same time, the firm has dramatically restructured the former collective’s assets, 
organization, and management. The inefficient livestock herd was cutback sharply. The 
number of workers was reduced from more than 1,000 to 375. The number of agricultural 
managers and technical employees was reduced by over one-half, while the company hired 
better trained agricultural managers and offered salaries and bonuses that were well above 
local levels. One of the company owners actually relocated from the city to the farm. 
Although owners were upset about depressing crop prices, they continued convert another 10 
th. ha of farmland into ownership. Most recently the company arranged the (probably first in 
Russia!) investment credit against the pledge of company-owned land as collateral for loans 
from a local bank. 
 
  These four cases illustrate some of the general patterns observed in the emergence of 
new operators in Russia. 
 
1. The entrepreneurs are responding to perceived profit opportunities in production 
agriculture – primarily in the former collective sector.  
 
2. The new ventures are founded by outsiders with access to credit, processing 
services, or end-user markets. 
 
3. The agroholdings focus, to a large extent, on overcoming input market 
imperfections, supplying machinery services, credit, ag chemicals, managerial services, and 
skilled labor. 
 
4. The agroholdings make significant investments and technological improvements in 
production agriculture. 
 
5. Some agroholding founders work closely with administrative officials in 
developing and managing their businesses.  
6.  The social consequences in rural areas appear to be mixed – layoffs are common, 
yet all firms try to guarantee competitive land lease payments to rural people and some firms 




4.2     Entry patterns and functions 
 
 
We distinguish five principal patterns of an outside operator's entry in domestic 
agriculture (Figure 1): 
•  become financial "sponsor" of the farm 
•  enter joint production agreements 
•  provide custom farming services 
•  lease agricultural land 
•  acquire farm's non-land or total assets. 
Figure 1. Entry patterns and functions 
 
 
The ownership and control patterns, as well as functions of "traditional" 
independent collective farms are being eroded and modified by outside operators. 
Sponsored farms occupy an intermediate position between "traditional" and "new" 
farms. "Sponsors" are usually wealthy non-agricultural entities. They do not directly 
control and own farm assets and do not manage the farm on a daily basis. Sponsors 
typically bear the farm's financial failure risk. Their main function is to provide a 
guarantee to an input supplier or financial creditor or to invest in farming activities 
themselves. The sponsored farms usually belong to the elite part of Russian collective or 
private farms. Another indirect sponsor's function is to assist transformation of a 
"traditional" farm into a more up-to-date operation. Under joint production agreements 
outside entities don't become owners of farm assets, but participate in farm production 
decision-making. Under custom farming, an outside firm provides production services 
and partly bears the risks of crop failure, adverse commodity price trends and other market developments. Under land lease agreements an outside firm engages in all 
production activities and takes agricultural risks dependent on and limited by the size of 
the leased land plot. Acquisition of farm non-land assets is typically accompanied by 
land lease from individual land share owners or municipal authorities and fully makes 
the firm an agricultural producer. In most Russian cases the acquisition of non-land 
assets is made in the form of establishing a new legal entity that is not burdened with 
overdue debts. The new entity acquires the most valuable physical assets from the old 
farm and in one way or another (gradually) solves the old farm's outstanding debt 
problem
4. The side effect of the operation is the emergence of numerous "shell" (asset-
empty) legal agricultural entities that exist only on paper. 
 
 
4.2    Size and scope of NAOs sector 
 
 
As of late May 2004 we have collected information on 150 NAOs functioning in 
32 out of 89 Russian administrative regions. Many developed domestic agricultural 
production regions (such as Astrakhan, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, 
Tyumen, Vologda, Russian Far East region, etc.) have not been examined yet due to the 
limited size of the study. And many regions, although included into the database, are still 
under-investigated. In addition, our list of NAOs does not include such "frontier" NAOs 
formats, as custom farming (unless they are linked with concrete farming unit), "sponsored" 
and "joint production agreement" farms. In our survey we focused on land lease and non-
land farm acquisition formats. 
 
Out of 150 surveyed companies, managers of 115 provided information on the size 
of controlled land. Others failed or refused to provide the information, or it was irrelevant 
due to the commercial livestock specialization of the holding. In 2003 the total number of 
farm production units controlled by the 115 companies amounted to 1026 entities, and 
agricultural land area under their control - to 6119 thousand hectares. 
 
 
4.3    Origin and entry period 
 
 
The data on origin of the farm holding "mother company" (farm project 
originator) is quite ambiguous as most of them are diversified, while others are parts of 
bigger holding groups. The general distribution by sector of origin and period of emergence 
is given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. NAOs matrix by origin and entry period, thousand ha 
 
  A  T  F  AS  AG  с  U  в  S  Total 
Before and 1998 0  0  0 0 0 0 0  71  530 601
1999-2000  585  34  369  47  0  345  0  0  942  2323 
2001-2003  727  90  498  166  55  259  217  по  1334  2256 
Total  1312  124 867 213 55 604 217  181  1606 5180
%                     
Before and 1998 0  0  0 0 0 0 0  39  33 11
1999-2000  45  27  43  22  0  57  0  0  59  45 
2001-2003  55  73  57  78  100  43  100  61  8  44 
Notes: Data for holdings that answered the respective question. Origin: industry focus of 
the mother company. A -diversified agribusiness, T - procurement and ag commodity 
trade, F - food industry, AS - ag supplier, AG -agricultural producer, В - 
banking/finance, S - state and quasi state entity, N - unidentified, С - industrial conglomerates. 
Source: IKAR NAOs database. 
Table 1 confirms the theory of multiple motivation for NAOs start-ups. The surveyed 
companies with various agribusiness and other industry roots entered agriculture 
immediately after the 1998 financial crisis or in modern post-crisis time, in response to the 
booming food consumer demand and growing ag. commodity export opportunities. The 
surveyed companies with direct banking and financial roots typically entered agricultural 
production either well before, or well after the financial crisis. Finally, the state and quasi 
state organizations represent the most diversified entry cause/motivation spectrum. Some of 
them are quasi-privatized parts of traditional Soviet industrial monopolies (Gasprom), 
some remain owned by regional governments (Bashptitseprom),  some were recently 




4.4    Regional location and concentration 
 
 
NAOs tend to be created in the most productive regionsand/or close access to the end 
user market. According to the Moscow oblast agricultural officials, more than half of 
oblast's collective farms are already controlled by "investors". In Tatarstan (according to 
local officials) "investors" acquired about 700 thousand ha, or 15% of all farmland. In Orel 
oblast, according to our (incomplete) database, NAOs control 56% of all farmland. The 
concentration of holding companies may be even higher at rayon (district) level. In 
Belgorod, Krasnodar, Moscow, Tambov oblasts there are rayons, where almost all 
collective farms are controlled by one holding company. As a rule, the key local 
procurement and/or food processing facility is controlled by the same company. Such a 
concentration of power presents a challenge to the domestic agribusiness decision-makers. 
 
 
4.5     NAOs project profiles 
 
 
Out of 150 surveyed companies, 58 specialize on crop production, 48 are 
diversified farm operations and 26 are livestock producers (the rest failed or refused to 
provide information on specialization). More than 30 surveyed companies gave annual 
agricultural revenue figures. They show quite a strong correlation between project land size 
and earnings in case the company is a crop or diversified farm operation. 
 
Table 2 provides information on crop and diversified farm operations by project land 
size. Being a part of the emerging sector, NAOs vary greatly by project size. It may range 
from one farm unit with several thousand hectares (Uspenskiy Elevator, Altay; 
Krasnodaragroalians,  Krasnodar) to a multi-unit mega-size farming operation located in 
several regions (Youg Rusi, Razguliay, etc.). 
Table 2. Break-down L of NAOs ag lands by origin and size 
  A  T  F  AS  AG  в  С  и  S  Total: 
Thousand ha 
>300  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1344  1344 
200-299  200 0  0  0 0 0 180 0  0  380
100-199  692 0  225  100 0 0 0 0  239  1256
50-99  214  72  255  65  85  110  286  80  0  1167 
<50  414 191  445  123 142 71 216 346  23  1971
Total:  1520 263  925  288 227 181 682 426  1606  6119
Number of holdings >300  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  3 
200-299  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  2 
100-199  6  0  2  1 0 0 0 0  2  11
50-99  3  1  4  1 1 1 4 1  0  16
<50  18  9  17  5  7  1  10  15  1  83 
Total:  28  10  23  7  8  2  15  16  6  115 
Note: see footnotes to Table 1.  
Source: IKAR' NAOs data base. 
 
During the last three years the average NAOs size has not grown significantly, m 
2001 the average number of production farming units per project (holding company) for the 
studied 115 companies was 8.9 while the average land area (leased and owned) was 54.8 
thousand ha. In 2003 these figures were 8.3 and 53.2, respectively. In terms of modal (most 
typical) estimate, in 2001 a typical farm project had 3 production units and 40 thousand ha of 
farmland (total). In 2003 these figures were 3 and 30 thousand, respectively. Moreover, the 
biggest companies tend not to expand in terms of land area, while smaller ones continue to 
grow aggressively. In 2001 11 of the surveyed biggest land holdings controlled 2278 
thousand ha (207 thousand ha on the average). In 2003 the same companies 
controlled 2284 thousand ha, and 3 of them have substantially cut the land area, m 
contrast, in 2001 36 "small" holdings (30 thousand ha of farmland and less) controlled 
523 thousand ha. In 2003 the same companies extended their operations to 1059 thousand 
ha. These developments may be interpreted as a search for optimal holding size given 
potential management difficulties faced by the biggest farm holdings. Such a conclusion is 
confirmed by our case studies (EFCO, 2003). It is also important to mention that the biggest 




4.6     NAOs and vertical integration 
 
 
Our case studies demonstrate that NAOs (in a broad meaning) may or may not be 
linked with vertical integration. It quite strongly depends on the origin and industry. State 
and quasi state, as well as conglomerate and banking companies tend to be in agriculture as 
an industry, not as a part of vertical supply chain. On the other hand, smaller regional 
agribusiness holdings tend to establish close links with owned farm supply, procurement or 
processing facilities. Large, diversified interregional agribusiness companies usually 
employ vertical integration strategies, although the real agribusiness assets' integrity 
(including farming units) may be very modest. In addition, even a big agricultural operation 
may not match the company's vertical pipeline needs. Our EFCO case clearly demonstrates 
this: the company possesses a huge multi-farm operation of 100 thousand ha but it covers 
only about 7% of the company's raw input (sunseeds) requirements. 
 
The highest level of vertical integration is observed in the domestic poultry 
industry, where 5 leading vertically integrated companies (Severnaya, Planeta, Agroholding, 
APK Mikhailovskiy, Golden Rooster) control 24 farms and provide 35.1% of the national 
broiler output (IKAR, 2003). Other identified holding companies control another 13.1% of 
the output, while the rest is still produced by independent collective farms. In other 
industries the level of real integration is much lower, although the presence of leading 
agribusiness companies in agriculture is high. For example, in the grain industry out of 10 
leading exporters 6 (Agrico, Aston, Razguliay, Roskhleboproduct, Youg Rusi, 
Yugtransitservice)  have grain production projects. In the sugar beet industry all the 10 
leading companies (accounting for about 85% of the output) have sugar beet production 
projects. However, both in the grain and sugar beet sectors the level of company captive-owned supply remains quite modest. 
 
 
4.7     Drivers of the sector 
 
 
The data in Table 1 and other company survey materials demonstrate that even in the 
most recent years (after the well-documented post-crisis entry motivations have expired) the 
NAOs sector continues to grow. The number of new registered entries exceeds the number of 
exits. Our ongoing survey of the top agroholdings management provides the following details. 
Out of 28 surveyed companies 20 increased their land size since the project inception, while 
only 8 decreased or have kept it the same. 19 companies provided estimates of current and 
future (in 5 years) shares of the new operators vs. collective vs. individual farms in 
commercial ag output. The estimated current share of the agroholdings output in their regions 
/districts varies widely from 10% to 90%. The management almost unanimously considers 
that should current trends continue in 5 years time the share of agroholdings would amount to 
30-100%. Notably, 8 managers consider the share of private farmers will increase as well, 
while 17 believe share of collective farms would drop considerably. Probably, the most 
important fact is that even if a company decides to leave agriculture, its farm project is 
inherited/taken by another outsider (OGO, Planta, ISC cases). In other words, there is no way 
back to the collective farm.  
 
 
4.8 Agroholdings’ problems identification 
 
 
Our ongoing survey provides interesting results regarding the new operators’ 
problems self-identification. To facilitate the response process we designed 10-scale problem 
importance questionnaire and received the following response from 26 companies. 
                    Average est.          Modal est.  
Lack or deficit of qualified managers        8.12         10 
Lack or limited efficiency of the state regulation                7.81                     10 
Limited domestic market protection from the import    7.27                                 10    
General difficult inheritance of old problems      6.92          5 
Unstable weather/climatic conditions                   6.88                     7 
O n - f a r m   t h e f t            5 . 6 2             3  
Lack of rule of law, administrative arbitrariness      5.38          7 
Project giantism and non-manageability        4.31          2 
 
  Surprisingly, project giantism and on-farm theft are not mentioned among the main 
problems, probably partly because of sensitivity issue. Meanwhile lack of qualified farm 
managers and inefficient government involvement are positioned among top headaches. 
Generally, the above given problems received very high priority status. Contrary, 10-scale 
estimates of currently available government programs for domestic agriculture receive very 
modest appraisal ranging from 3.24 (federal ag leasing program) to 5.80 (federal program of 
working capital interest rate subsidy) with modal estimates not higher than 5. 
 
 
5. SELECTED CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
1.  It is clear that the traditional domestic three-sector Russian farming doctrine is not 
adequate any longer. All aspects of the domestic farm policy - from official agricultural 
statistics to state farm support - must be reconsidered given the emergence of new 
operational formats. The official definition of an "agricultural producer" should be 
matched with the reality. For example, a full service highly capitalized custom farming 
operator can be considered not a producer (and will not be eligible for farm support 
programs), while a "shell" (asset-empty) collective farm may still enjoy various producer 
privileges. 
2.  The destiny of independent collective farm. It appears that independent collective 
farm is gradually dissolving. One should briefly mention just three of its biggest problems: 
(a) Numerous nominal owners-employees lack real ownership and control function; (b) Lack 
of bankability due to inefficient management (reasons are rooted in (a)); (c) Lack of legal and 
organizational protection, which makes the farm exposed to very high risks in the modern 
domestic political and economic environment. The decision makers must keep in mind 
this potential historic scenario when considering policy measures. 
3.  The destiny of individual family farming. Despite its apparent failure in modern Russia, 
in the long term we remain optimistic about the concept of family farm in the country. 
There are first signs of turning mega-farming projects towards more operational freedoms 
of smaller production units. Some holdings create and incorporate family farms into their 
operations. Again, the decision makers must keep in mind this potential (very promising) 
historic scenario when considering policy measures. 
4.  In a relatively short time NAOs have become the most powerful sector in the 
domestic agriculture. The   sector's agricultural  value   at  risk  is  enormous. Meanwhile   
agribusiness administrators tend to ignore the NAOs' views on the key domestic 
agribusiness regulation programs. The classic example is the regulation of domestic sugar 
and meat industries. NAOs must make efforts to launch the sector's consolidated lobbying 
platform, while authorities must develop mechanisms to respond to the powerful industry 
voice. One of the solutions is the approval of Law on industry associations. 
5. To make necessary investments in agriculture, NAOs have to collateralize their non-
agricultural assets (at least in the foreseeable future, having in mind domestic agriculture's 
under-capitalization level). First, it refocuses and distracts company's resources from key 
industrial projects. Second, given naturally high agricultural risks the company faces a 
significant  threat of losing its entire business. The government should provide adequate 
support package helping to mitigate risks of new agricultural investors. The brief list of the 
most urgent measures is as follows:  
• Radical modification and strengthening of the absolutely outdated general and 
agricultural collateral legislation (efficient grain warehouse receipts legislation and 
enforcement system, legalization of lean rights, launching of rural credit bureaus and 
collateral filing offices, launching of simplified out-of-court credit enforcement 
procedures). These measures would many times increase the rural collateral mass and 
make investments against rural collateral less risky.  
• Modification of the current crop insurance government program to make it more 
available and reasonable for the wide range of agricultural investors (development of 
alternative subsidized insurance packages, shift from all-inclusive to specific risks 
coverage packages, conversion from historically low to investment-based insurance 
values, satisfactory solution of reinsurance issue, and others). Again, such a modification 
would lower pre-harvest investment risks. 6. Land lease and ownership rights. The issue remains extremely foggy, which makes long-
term investments in agriculture extremely risky and costly. For example, before signing land 
lease agreements, new entrants have to take care of proper land ownership rights' 
registration by numerous individual land share owners. In other words, they pay for the bad 
government job. And the cost of land plot registration may exceed the cost of land itself. It 
would be reasonable if these costs were born by authorities, not the private business. 
We are eyewitnesses of just the initial steps of domestic agriculture's organizational change. 
Further intensive research is necessary to track the situation and make profound 
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